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“Evaluating Fear Appeals” argues for a conception of argumentation moored to 
actuality, to the whirling, insistent moment of engagement, to the strategies and (I 
would add) tactics that speakers “actually use.” Manolescu urges us to embrace what 
she calls a “normative pragmatic theory of fear appeals” against earlier conceptions 
(Walton, for example) that rely on logical cogency, on the reconstruction of implied 
inference, and on logical dialogue for their hermeneutic resonance. Using the 
speeches of Patrick Henry during debates about the ratification of the US constitution 
in late eighteenth-century Virginia, Manolescu insists that we abandon generic 
classification and “dialogue types,” habitual recourse to formal or informal cogency, 
and “underlying” inferential structures as explanantia, all for a theory tuned to 
contexts, to deliberative moments, to decorum and prudence. Her deft, sophisticated 
intervention—one which explains the ways in which agents “engage norms of 
argumentation” in given discursive contexts, which accounts for elements other than 
ratio—is welcome, but the “normative pragmatic theory of fear appeals” Manolescu 
endorses is antique. In Aristotle and especially in the Roman and neo-Roman 
conceptions of rhetoric, the pragmatic and the normative turn on conceptions of 
movement: how might an opponent, an interlocutor, an audience be moved? what 
constitutes movement? In Manolescu’s context, the appeal to fear is an appeal for 
movement, and it is always already an appeal to the imagination: as she intimates, 
fear appeals either demand or attempt to foreclose deliberation or action, and both 
deliberation and action depend on phantasmata or images. To be moved is to be 
moved emotionally and such movement—the beginnings, as it were, of deliberation 
and action—depends on phantasia.   
 A brief excursion into Aristotelian ‘psychology’ and the importance of 
phantasia will acquaint us with the workings of fear. Never found without sensation 
(and thus we share “impressions” [phantasiais] with other species), imagination 
(phantasia) is the faculty of “what appears” (427b7ff.). The term itself is complex, 
and richly designates the faculty that registers, or has the capacity to register, 
appearances, the “on-going appearance itself,” and “what appears.” It has for its 
content “what can be perceived” (428b12-13), though it is identical neither to 
sensation or perception, opinion or thought (427b7ff., 428a5-428b9). Yet phantasia is 
integral to “the synthesis and retention of sense-perceptions” and to “applying thought 
to objects of sense-perception” (Frede, p. 279, 282). (The modern term “imagination” 
is poor in comparison, and we should be wary of identifying “what appears” only or 
simply with images [Nussbaum, p. 242].) Although thought is separable from the 
body (408b29-30, 429b5), the soul cannot think without images (431a16-17, 432a13-
14), which are “like sensuous contents except that they contain no matter.” Phantasia 
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“captures” sensations, as it were: Aristotle argues that even when a sensible object is 
no longer present to the senses, the modifications (“movements”) it causes may 
remain in the perceiving subject’s senses or imagination as after-images or vestiges of 
the original perception (De anima, 425b24, 429a5-8). These after-images—
phantasms—are lodged in the common sense and the phantasia, they may represent an 
object as helpful or harmful, and thus they may carry with them feelings of pleasure 
or pain. Aristotle’s point here is that both actual objects and phantasms produce 
similar reactions. Although “when we are under the influence of imagination we are 
not more affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror or 
confidence” (427b23ff.), the magnitude of influence is nevertheless significant: 
phantasmata “remain in us and resemble the corresponding sensations” (429a3). 
Hence human beings are stimulated to feel, to deliberate, and to act not only by 
present objects but by phantasms, which represent an object remembered or 
anticipated as helpful or harmful (De anima, 431b2ff; cf. Rhetoric, 1370a28ff.).  
 Deliberation and action depend on appetite and phantasia, too. A “living 
creature is capable of moving itself only in so far as it has appetite; but it has no 
appetite without phantasms or imagination” (433b28-29; cf. 433a20). Human beings 
cannot deliberate without phantasms (427b11-15, 428b, 431a-b, 434a). The study of 
action, then, “falls within the province of the functions common to body and soul” 
(433a9-21, 433b18-20), the subject of the Parva naturalia. A stalwart resident of that 
province is error. While past philosophers and poets have equated sensation with 
thought, since both produce somatic “motion” and both fluctuate with bodily change, 
they ought to have considered error, Aristotle writes, “a state which is peculiarly 
characteristic of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part of its 
time” (427b1-2). Sensation cannot be wrong, or at least it is subject to “the minimum 
of error” (428b19), but the imagination is frequently wayward. Imaginations are “for 
the most part false” (428a11-12, 433a).  
 The potential mendacity of the imagination, its trade in “what appears,” is not 
only a problem for philosophers but for rhetoricians as well. To Quintilian, eloquence 
is “mainly a psychological matter: it is the mind which must be emotionally stirred 
and must conceive images, and adapt itself to suit the nature of the subject which is 
theme of the speech” (1.2.30.53): the mind is moved by emotion and that movement is 
dependent on images; only when we are moved and conceive images of things do we 
adapt ourselves to, and understand, a speech, a situation, a conversation, an event. The 
resonance of images, their immediacy, speaks to their power:  
 
There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasiai, and the Romans visions, 
whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they 
seem actually to be before our very eyes. ... From such impressions arises that enargeia which 
Cicero calls illumination and actuality (illustratio et evidentia) which makes us seem not so 
much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene (6.2.29, 32) 
 
Such “vivid conceptions ... which ... are called phantasiai” must be keep before the 
eyes and “admitted to our hears,” Quintilian writes elsewhere, for “it is feeling and 
the force of mind (vis mentis) that make us eloquent” (10.7.15). Feeling and vis mentis 
are transacted through phantasmata; here, perhaps, is one of the anxieties that dogged 
rhetoricians since the Sophists: their trade, and their medium, is the imaginative. In 
part, the worry is ethical for, according to Aristotle, emotional experience is 
dependent on images (1382a21-23, 1371a9, 1371a19, 1384a23). As Aristotle 
suggests, “all men aim at the apparent good, but [some] have no control over how 
things appear ... but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. 
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“We reply,” he continues, “that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is 
in, he will also be himself somehow responsible for how things appear” (1114a31-
1114b3).  If states of character arise out of activities and habits (NE, 1103b17ff.), 
clearly managing images (“how things appear”) is crucial. 
 Like honour, love, or shame, fear turns on images. Fear, Aristotle writes, “may 
be defined as a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil 
in the future.” To experience fear, the danger must have a particular magnitude (for 
example, we do not fear stupidity) and must “appear not remote but not so near as to 
be imminent” (1382a22-25). Fear involves either prolepsis (“something ... likely to 
happen” at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, at a particular time” 
[1382b33-35]) or a rather vague sense of anticipation. Aristotle explains: 
 
when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel 
that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others who 
were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves, at 
the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time.  (1383a8-
12) 
 
In Manolescu’s examples, Henry appeals to the latter, amorphous fear, which depends 
on making one’s audience “feel” that they are in danger using the stalwart tools of an 
orator: imagination and exemplarity. According to Manolescu, in his declamations 
Henry “engages a norm that we ought to deliberate in perilous situations,” in a sense, 
as she implies, inverting the usual reaction to certain magnitudes and forms of fear; 
but it is precisely this second sense of fear, which is underwritten by phantasia and 
exemplarity, that Henry conjures.     
 This intervention should not suggest that everything new is old again. Rather, 
if I were involved in the field of argumentation theory, I might suggest, as a spurring 
prolegomenon, a return to the history, or histories, of rhetoric. I might, for example, 
suggest that Manolescu’s argument rehearses material and concepts from the history 
of rhetoric in the Aristotelian, and indeed in the Grassian, tradition. I might suggest a 
return to Aristotle’s Rhetoric for contemporary answers about appeals to fear, for the 
Rhetoric is the first manual for everyday life, an engaging treatise on politics and 
persuasion, listening and the passions; it is a delicate, nuanced inquiry into human 
experience. And however one thinks of experience—as amorphous or foundational, 
fragile or lost—the relationships between structures, process, and agency, between 
experience and meaning, are sifted and accessed rhetorically. Rhetoric is a flexible, 
responsive mode of inquiry: it encompasses multiple discursive practices while laying 
bare motives, issues, strategies, and tactics with respect to speaking and listening, 
ideation and affect, the passions and persuasion. Aristotle’s project in the Rhetoric, 
especially in books one and two, is connecting habits of thought with action and 
belief. If the Rhetoric is read together with the De anima, as it should be, his lissome 
programme provides ways into and out of the skein of individual thoughts, desires, 
imaginations, and their social capacities and effects. Its area of inquiry is the complex 
matrix of individual experience—including fear—in its discursive and social contexts. 
Rhetoric in the Aristotelian tradition embodies a set of flexible, investigative criteria, 
one that stipulates at the very least areas of inquiry: we do not deliberate about that 
which cannot be otherwise. Deliberation about that which might be otherwise is 
complex, not least since guidelines for every situation and comprehensive rules of 
propriety that govern all discursive and behavioural occasions do not, cannot, exist. In 
ethical and political contexts, in psychological inquiry, the investigative canons are 
rhetorical. 
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 In one sense, then, the opposition between cognitive and “normative 
pragmatic” theories is straw: in the history of rhetoric (or, say, in the history of 
argumentation), the two are precisely separated in theory, but rarely immured from 
one another in practice. In the history of rhetoric from antiquity to early modernity, 
there is an increasing emphasis on emotional appeal; by the sixteenth century, 
rhetoricians almost wholly neglect the syllogism, for example, which slowly became a 
province of logic, and their resources are redirected to exploring the means of 
securing agreement, and of avoiding dissensus, with pathos and ethos rather than 
logos (see Skinner, pp. 120-127, although he does not make his argument explicit).  
That division is certainly evident in contemporary appeals to fear. 
 
link to paper
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